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NOTES AND COMMENTS
extended to the point, as applied to utterances, where there is clear and
present danger 76 that such utterances unless restrained will deny the
employees rights guaranteed by the Act.77 From the words of one
court it would appear that all speech by the employer is protected "un-
less the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may
befall before there is opportunity for full discussion.
'78
Undoubtedly, a privileged speech delivered to a captive audience
under certain unusual circumstances and over objections of the em-
ployees might clearly constitute coercion and thereby lose its constitu-
tional protection. But the Board's finding as a fact that a speech,
regardless of its privileged nature standing alone, delivered to a captive
audience thereby becomes coercive and ceases to be privileged seems an
unwarranted denial of freedom of speech and a departure from the
traditional interpretation of the First Amendment.
LENNOX P. McLENDON, JPR.
Federal Income Taxation-Dividend Income-
Accvual Accounting
In July, 1946, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seve*nth Circuit
in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Light and
Traction CompanyL held that a dividend declared in 1937 to stockholders
of record at specified date in December, 1937, and payable in January,
1938, was taxable as income in 1938, when paid in 1938, regardless of
whether the stockholder was on an "accrual basis" or on a "cash basis."
The court concluded that the date of actual receipt, and not the date of
declaration, determined the taxability of the income. 'The commission-
er's contention throughout that the "record date" should be controlling
brought no comment from the court other than that this was the first
time such a theory had been urged.
The cases on this precise point are few. The decision in the prin-
cipal case followed primarily that of Tar Products Corp. v. Commis-
sioner2 decided in September, 1942, which had overruled a Board of Tax
"The "clear and present danger" test as generally applied by the courts in
freedom of speech cases was first used by Mr. Justice Holmes speaking for a
unanimous court in Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). It has since
been used in a series of important cases: Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) ; Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting); Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U. S. 625 (1925)
(Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 (1927) (concur-
ring opinion by Brandeis, J.); People v. Garcia, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 753, 98 P.
(2d) 265 (1939) ; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). For more re-
cent cases see note 70 supra.
"'49 STAT. 449 (1935) 29 U. S. C. §151-166 (1940 ed.).78Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927).
1156 (F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
2130 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942).
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Appeals decision standing since 1927.3 Because of the Tar Products
decision, when the principal case arose in the Tax Court,4 that court
merely yielded to the decision of the circuit court of appeals and held
contrary to its former views, refusing to discuss the relative merits
of its own views and those of the circuit court of appeals.
In the two decisions placing all stockholders on the "cash basis" of
accounting with respect to dividend income for tax purposes,5 the courts
relied heavily on the commissioner's interpretation of Code Section
11 5 (a),6 which is set out in Regulation 1117 as follows: "A taxable
distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders shall be included
in the gross income of the distributees when the cash or other property
is unqualifiedly made subject to their demands." This regulation was
interpreted by both courts to apply alike to "cash basis" and "accrual
basis" stockholders for two reasons. First, because it had for many
years made no distinction between the two ;8 and second, because of the
commissioner's non-acquiescence in the Board of Tax Appeals decision
in 19279 which had allowed accrual of a dividend in the year of
declaration.
As to the first reason, it appears that the regulation, in addition to
having no binding effect,'0 is more susceptible to the interpretation that
it applies only to a "cash basis" shareholder in order to prevent his
turning his back on income available to him so as to postpone its receipt
until the next year."' Moreover, the Revenue Act of 1921, Section
201(e), itself contained a similar provision, which was dropped from
the 1924. Act, and upon a review of the legislative history of Section
201(e) it was determined that it in effect was to prevent a "cash basis"
taxpayer from failing to report income unqualifiedly available to him,
though not actually received. But since it was thought this was the
rule which would be applied even in the absence of a statutory provision
it was stricken from the Act.'2 It was thought, and reasonably so, that
this provision in Section 201(e) inspired the above regulation.'3
' The circuit court of appeals decision in the Tar Products case reversed the
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals in 45 B. T. A. 1033 (1941), which had
followed its earlier decision on the same point in Campbell v. Commissioner, 6
B. T. A. 60 (1927).
"3 T. C. 1048 (1944).
Cited supra notes 1 and 2.
INTERNAL REVENUE CoDE, §115(a), 26 U. S. C. A. §115(a).
"INCOmE TAx R_ uLATioNs 111, §29.115-1.
'The Regulations have used substantially identical language since 1921.
Campbell v. Commissioner, cited supra note 3.
"' However, its long standing without any change by Congress might be
deemed to give it the force and effect of law. See Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U. S. 110 (1939); Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue
Acts (1941) 54 HAiv. L. REv. 377.
See John A. Brander, 3 B. T. A. 231 (1925).
" Cecil Q. Adams, 20 B. T. A. 243, 245 (1930) ; see also Mary Miller Brax-
ton, 22 B. T. A. 128 (1931).
13 45 B. T. A. 1033, 1034, see note 3 supra.
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In relying on the second reason the courts are holding the commis-
sioner to his contention made nineteen years earlier, and in effect are
giving more weight to the commissioner's opinion in the 1927 case than
to that of the Board of Tax Appeals. Consequently the courts are
reversing the authority which taxpayers have been following (or should
have been), and are holding in accordance with the commissioner's
former view, which he is here, in both cases, denouncing by asserting
his belief to be in accord with the former authority which held that the
dividend should be accrued by a shareholder properly reporting on the
"accrual basis". Accordingly it seems that the second reason given by
the court for its interpretation of the regulation is unsound.
In the application of the "single rule" the court in the principal case
(Commissirner v. American Light & Traction Co.) states additional
reasons. It says that it makes possible the checking of taxpayers' re-
turns against the corporation record of disbursement. It must be con-
ceded that the information return required by Code Section 148(a)
14
serves the practical purpose of aiding the commissioner to check the
accuracy of shareholders' returns, but having the dividends reported on
the information return included by "accrual basis" shareholders in one
year and by "cash basis" shareholders in the next would not render the
information worthless-at most it would merely require the commis-
sioner to use each information return partly for one year and partly for
the next.
Another reason given by the court is that application of the "single
rule" will prevent variations in the tax paid where dividends are paid
in kind and the value of the property fluctuates. However, it seems that
there should be no substantial objection to such a situation; but on the
contrary, it seems more desirable for the shareholder to report it in the
manner in which he reports the rest of his income and disbursements,
whether on the "cash basis" or "accrual basis," in order that the return
will more properly reflect his gains for the period. Practically speaking,
the tax paid by two shareholders on any particular dividend distribution
would probably not be the same even though they reported the income
in the same taxable year, and were holders of identical amounts of the
stock, because they would be in different income brackets and would
be affected differently by the same amount. But assuming for the sake
of example that their total taxable net incomes are the same, that they
are holders of an equal number of shares, and that tax rates applicable
to the two years are the same, then the "accrual basis" shareholder
would pay the same amount of tax on the dividend as the "cash basis"
11 "Every corporation shall, when required by the Commissioner, render a cor-
rect return, duly verified under oath, of its payments of dividends, stating the
name and address of each shareholder, the number of shares owned by him, and
the amount of dividends paid to him." 26 U. S. C. A. 148 (a).
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shareholder, except where the value of the stock distributed as a divi-
dend fluctuated between the record date and the date of receipt. But
in view of the fact that the "acquisition value" to each shareholder
would be the market value upon which he had paid tax, and that this
value is the one upon which each would compute a gain or loss upon
selling or otherwise disposing of the stock, the objection to the differ-
ence in the tax paid on the distribution would seem to lose much of
its force. 15
Another reason given by the court is that a dividend is not taxable
unless paid out of earnings and the proportion of earnings to capital
used in paying cannot be determined until the date of payment in many
cases. As to this argument, it seems that it would be a rare situation
indeed in which the proportion of earnings to capital would not be
known by the paying corporation fairly close to the end of its operating
year (whether calendar or fiscal), and in consequence that information
would usually be available to the shareholders in ample time to record
as non-taxable income that portion of their dividend income attributable
to non-taxable distributions. 6
Finally the court reasoned that the dividend might be subject to
double taxation in the case of transfer of the stock from an "accrual
25 Suppose that a dividend in the stock of another company is declared Decem-
1, 1946, to stockholders of record December 15, 1946, payable January 10, 1947.
Suppose that on the record date (December 15) the market value of the stock
was $50, and by the payment date (January 10) the market value had fallen to
$45. Under these conditions the shareholder on the "accrual basis" would be taxed
on $50 and the shareholder on the "cash basis" on $45. Then suppose that both
sold these stocks on February 15, 1947, at which time they received the current
market value of $55 per share. Here the "accrual basis" shareholder who had
been taxed on $50 would have a taxable short term capital gain of only $5, where
the "cash basis" shareholder would have a taxable short term capital gain of $10.
Thus it can be seen that the total tax to each shareholder would tend to equalize,
and at the same time consistency in reporting income for tax purposes would be
preserved.
It is conceivable that this equalization would not follow as closely in the case
of a loss due to the sale in the example above, because of the maximum allowable
deduction for a short term capital loss (INTERNAL REVENUE CODE §117(d)). But,
conceding that in such cases the total tax of the two shareholders would not pre-
cisely equalize; nevertheless each taxpayer will more properly reflect his total
taxable gains if he is required to report all income (and expense) in a consistent
manner.
"Assuming for the sake of example that the declaring corporation operates
on the basis of the calendar year, the shareholders would normally have until
March 15 to file their returns, and certainly by the end of January the declaring
corporation will have been able to determine the proportion.
If the declaring corporation and the shareholder were operating on years end-
ing at different dates (say June 30, and December 31), the situation would be
worse. However, the "single rule" cannot cure this situation because the share-
holder's income will be taxable long before the end of the declaring corporation's
year.
But in view of the state statutes requiring that dividends may be declared only
from earnings (see 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OP PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS §5329, and cases cited there in note 56) except in cases of liquidation, the
likelihood that the determination of the taxable proportion of a dividend will
present a major problem seems relatively slight.
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basis" to a "cash basis" taxpayer between the record date and the date
of payment. Here it seems that since the stockholder of record, who is
the "accrual basis" stockholder in the court's example, would be the
one to whom the dividend check would be sent, that the sale subsequent
to the record date would have no effect, since this would ordinarily be
an ex-dividend transfer. Of course, where the sale, by agreement of
the parties, also transfers or assigns the dividend, the "accrual basis"
stockholder would be taxed on the dividend which he had assigned to
his vendee, but he would have received something by virtue of the sale
in consideration of the assignment of the dividend, and the difference
between the amount he received as consideration for the assignment
and the amount of the dividend would be reported as interest expense
(normally the dividend would be discounted) ; and the loss or gain on
the stock itself would be reported as a capital gain or loss. The vendee
"cash basis" stockholder should not be taxed because the dividend was
not income to him, but merely the consideration moving to him in the
contract, and for which he paid. Probably some small part of it would
be interest income (in the same amount as the vendor's interest expense)
and should be so reported. And so it can be seen that the courts' ex-
ample of double taxation of one dividend would not materialize.
In the Tar Products case' 7 upon which the decision of the principal
case is based, the facts were for practical purposes the same; however, in
that case the commissioner was contending that the dividend should con-
stitute taxable income to the distributee on the "accrual basis" in the
year of declaration; without mention of record date. In dealing with
the question as placed before it, the court, it is submitted, properly held
that the date of declaration of a dividend would not be a convenient
date on which to compel a taxpayer to accrue it. However, the court
went on to say "for he will never receive it unless he is also a share-
holder upon the date when the books close, and that date is wholly sub-
ject to the corporation's convenience, not that of either the government
or taxpayer." Such reasoning overlooks the effect of a record date.
Once the record date is stated, and known, then the distributee can be
determined regardless of when the corporation closes its books, or
whether it closes them at all. Had the commissioner urged upon the
court in that case that the dividend should be accrued by the "accrual
basis" stockholder on the record date, it seems that the court's reason-
ing would have been more dearly shown to be unsound.
It is a fundamental concept in accounting that in order to accurately
reflect the position of a business, the income must be allocated to the
period when earned.' 8 It would seem to follow that where a definite
'TCited supra note 2.
18 See Kzsrza, ADvANcED AccouNTUNG (3d rev. ed. 1933), p. 183.
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debtor-creditor relationship arises conclusively, the period when earned
would be determined for purposes of accruing. The courts have di-
vided on the question of whether a corporate debt arises upon declara-
tion of a dividend or whether it arises upon the record date.10 The
federal courts seem to favor the latter2 0 Under either view it can be
seen that the debtor-creditor relationship does arise, with an absolute
right in the shareholder-creditor, at the latest, no later than the record
date; and it seems that under any view it would be proper to accrue
dividend income as of the record date.
2
1
It must be admitted that under the decision of the principal case,
there would be no accounting burden placed upon the "accrual basis"
shareholder in compelling him for tax purposes to report dividend in-
come on a "cash basis"; it would merely be an item of an accounting
adjustment for purposes of filing the tax return. And it may be argued
that once this procedure is established that each year will balance out the
next in as far as the tax burden itself is concerned. However, it is
nevertheless frue that in order to accurately and properly reflect the in-
come for a period, each item of income must be placed where the right
to it arose, and not the time of actual receipt.22 The basic idea under
the accrual system is that the books shall immediately reflect obligations
and expenses definitely incurred and income definitely earned, regard-
less of whether payment has been made or is due. The word "accrue"
does not mean that the item is due in the sense of being then payable.
The accrual system wholly disregards due dates.23
It has been argued that it would be impossible for stockholders to
accrue dividend income in the year of declaration, because very few
stockholders have reliable information as to when the declaration is
made.24  This argument is based on an excerpt from an accounting
handbook published in 1920,25 and it should be called to mind that such
information is much more readily available in 1946 than in 1920.20 Also
"9Declaration date: Ford v. Snook, 240 N. Y. 624, 148 N. E. 732; Beattie v.
Gidney, 99 N. J. Eq. 207, 132 At. 652; Western Securities Co. v. Silver King
Mining Co., 57 Utah 88, 113, 192 Pac. 664; Notes (1938) 27 GFORGETowN L. J.
74; Notes (1924) 38 HARv. L. REv. 245.
Record date: Smith v. Tacker, 133 Cal. App. 351, 24 P. (2d) 182; Richter &
Co. v. Light, 97 Conn. 364, 116 Atl. 600; Ford v. Ford Manufacturing Co., 222
Ill. App. 76, 84; Nutter v. Andrews, 246 Mass. 224, 142 N. E. 67.
See also Annotation 72 A. L. R. 982.
20 Sharp v. Commissioner, 91 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937); Buchanan v.
National Savings & Trust Co., 23 F. (2d) 994 (App. D. C. 1928).
2tSee PATON, ADVAN CED ACCOUNTING (1941), p. 193.22Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner, 292 U. S. 182 (1934).
2' Brown Co., 8 B. T. A. 112 (1927); see also Patrick McGuirl, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 74 F. (2d) 729 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
2" See dissenting opinion of Smith, Tar Products Corp. v. Commissioner, cited
supra note 3.2 0
MONTGOMm'S INCOME TAX PROCEDURE (1920), p. 450.
20 The larger newspapers devote whole sections to stock reports, and declarations
of dividends with the record dates are quoted therein. The, declarations of divi-
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it should be noted that this argument is aimed at not requiring an
accrual of the dividend income as of the date of declaration-a propo-
sition with which the writer here agrees-but they are not considering
the accrual as of the record date. And in support of this very propo-
sition the accounting authority referred to above as supporting the com-
pulsory "cash basis" view,2 7 in commenting upon the 1927 decision, 28
recognizes the record date as controlling.29  It should be further noted
that, assuming the information is not always immediately available, it
is not necessary to know of the directors' action at once in order to
accrue the income. Certainly the sooner the better, but it is simple and
common to accrue items long after they have arisen, but in time to get
them in the financial statements for the period.
A somewhat analogous situation to that in issue here, is the problem
arising upon the death of a stockholder, i.e., is the dividend income
taxable as income to the decedent or to his estatef In discussing the
proper accounting procedure applicable to this situation Professor Fin-
ney says, "dividends declared prior to decedents death are part of the
corpus, even though not collected, and those declared afterwards are
income to the estate."30 This accounting authority is placing the em-
phasis upon the declaration date which is earlier than the accrual date
urged in this article (except where declaration date and record date are
the same day), but the same principle is involved-that of allocating the
income to the proper period. The United States Supreme Court re-
cently partially settled this question by determining that the date of
accrual of the dividend income was not the declaration date.3 1  The
court there expressly 2 did not decide whether the controlling date
should be the record date or the payment date; however, its clear anal-
ysis of the situation placed the record date as the date at which all
elements were present which are necessary for a propr accrual, i.e., the
payor, the amount, and the payee. With this view of the arising of a
complete debtor-creditor relationship, it seems highly probable that the
Supreme Court would hold the record date to be the proper date for
recognition of dividend income by a shareholder on the "accrual basis."
Considering that possibility, it is regrettable that the commissioner did
not ask for certiorari in the principal case.
dends by the more closely held corporations may never reach newsprint, but there
the shareholders are practically in constant touch with the corporation and would
normally be well informed. Also, any shareholder whose business enterprise is
large enough to justify accounting on the "accrual basis" (normally an individual
would be on the "cash basis") will easily be able to make it a point to know the
declaration and record dates of dividends on the stock he holds.
= See note 24 supra. "8 See note 3 supra.
29 MONTGoMERY'S INcOME TAx PROCEDURE (1920), p. 294.20H. A. FINNEY, PmINcl'IEs OF ADVANCED AccouNTING (1946), p. 474.
Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 U. S. 393 (1945).
82 Id. at 398.
19471
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It appears from a practical point of view, and from the standpoint of
making the law follow a natural course in allowing proper accounting
procedure, that the record date should control the point at which an
"accrual basis" shareholder must accrue his dividend income. A share-
holder reporting all other income, and all disbursements, on an "accrual
basis" cannot, even for tax purposes, properly and accurately reflect his
income for a period so long as his dividend income is taxable as though
he were on the "cash basis."
It might be noted in closing that the holding in the principal case
is not objectionable to "accrual basis" shareholders having dividends
declared to stockholders of record on a date in 1946 and to be paid in
1947. With the "prospects" of lowered taxes for 1947, it is highly
desirable for everyone to postpone income until 1947, while at the same
time accruing as many expenses as possible for 1946. Should the tax
reductions not materialize for 1947, it would seem safe to say that at
least they will not be higher. However, this holding, though causing
possible bright outlooks for the present, may conceivably, when the
situation is reversed, cause an equal amount of hardship.
But under either situation, it is the consistency and logic of properly
reflecting income that is to be desired, and it is submitted that the hold-
ing of the principal case denies both when it places an "accrual basis"
shareholder, for tax purposes, partially upon a "cash basis."
WALTER E. BRock, JR.
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